China’s new condom tax will prove no effective barrier to country’s declining fertility rate

Once the world’s most populous nation, China is now among the many Asian countries struggling with anemic fertility rates. In an attempt to double the country’s rate of 1.0 children per woman, Beijing is reaching for a new tool: taxes on condoms, birth control pills and other contraceptives.

As of Jan. 1, such items were subject to a 13% value-added tax. Meanwhile, services such as child care and matchmaking remain duty-free.

The move comes after China last year allocated 90 billion yuan (US$12.7 billion) for a national child care program giving families a one-off payment of around 3,600 yuan (over $500) for every child age three or under.

I have studied China’s demography for almost 40 years and know that past attempts by the country’s communist government to reverse slumping fertility rates through policies encouraging couples to have more children have not worked. I do not expect these new moves to have much, if any, effect on reversing the fertility rate decline to one of the world’s lowest and far below the 2.1 “replacement rate” needed to maintain a stable population.

In many ways, the 13% tax on contraceptives is symbolic. A packet of condoms costs about 50 yuan (about $7), and a month supply of birth control pills averages around 130 yuan ($19). The new tax is not at all a major expense, adding just a few dollars a month.

Compare that to the average cost of raising a child in China – estimated at around 538,000 yuan (over $77,000) to age 18, with the cost in urban areas much higher. One 36-year-old father told the BBC he is not concerned over the price hike. “A box of condoms might cost an extra five yuan, maybe 10, at most 20. Over a year, that’s just a few hundred yuan, completely affordable,” he said.

Pronatalist failings

China is one of many countries to adopt pronatalist policies to address low fertility. But they are rarely effective.

The Singapore government has been concerned about the country’s very low fertility rate for a couple of decades. It tried to devise ways to boost it through programs such as paid maternity leave, child care subsidies, tax relief and one-time cash gifts. Yet, Singapore’s fertility rate – currently at 1.2 – remains one of the lowest in the world.

The government there even started limiting the construction of small, one-bedroom apartments in a bid to encourage more “family-friendly” homes of two bedrooms or more – anyone with children will appreciate the need for more space, right? Yet even that failed to budge the low fertility rate.

The Singaporean government got a helping hand in 2012 from candymaker Mentos. In a viral ad campaign, the brand called on citizens to celebrate “National Night” with some marital boom-boom as they “let their patriotism explode” – with a hoped-for corresponding burst in births in nine months’ time. Even with the assistance from the private sector, it appears, reversing declining fertility rates is a tricky thing.

South Korea, the country with the world’s lowest fertility rate – 0.7 – has been providing financial incentives to couples for at least 20 years to encourage them to have more children.

It boosted the monthly allowance already in place for married couples to become parents. In fact, since 2006 the South Korean government has spent well over $200 billion on programs to increase the Korean birth rate.

But South Korea’s fertility rate has continued to drop from 1.1 in 2006 to 1.0 in 2017, to 0.9 in 2019, to 0.7 in 2024.

Unfavorable headwinds

The plight of China is partly of its own doing. For a couple of decades the country’s one-child policy pushed to get fertility rates down. It worked, going from over 7.0 in the early 1960s to 1.5 in 2015.

That is when the government again stepped in, abandoning the one-child policy and permitting all couples to have two children. In May 2021, the two-child policy was abandoned in favor of a three-child policy.

The hope was that these changes would lead to a baby boom, resulting in sizable increases in the national fertility rate. However, the fertility rate continued to decline – to 1.2 in 2021 and 1.0 in 2024.

While China’s historic programs to push down fertility rates were successful, they were aided by wider societal changes: The policies were in force while China was modernizing and moving toward becoming an industrial and urbanized society.

It’s policies aimed at increasing the birth rate now find unfavorable societal headwinds. Modernization has led to better educational and work opportunities for women – a factor pushing many to put off having children.

In fact, most of China’s fertility reduction, especially since the 1990s, has been voluntary – more a result of modernization than fertility-control policies. Chinese couples are having fewer children due to higher living costs and educational expenses involved in having more than one child.

Plus, China is one of the world’s most expensive countries in which to raise a child, when compared to average income. School fees at all levels are higher than in many other countries.

The ‘low-fertility’ trap

Another factor to take into consideration is what demographers refer to as the “low-fertility trap.” This hypothesis, advanced by demographers in the 2000s, holds that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4 – far higher than China’s now stands – it is very difficult to increase it by 0.3 or more.

The argument goes that fertility declines to these low levels are largely the result of changes in living standards and increasing opportunities for women.

Accordingly, it is most unlikely that China’s three-child policy will have any influence at all on raising the fertility rate. And all my years of studying China’s demographic trends lead me to believe that making contraceptives marginally more expensive will also have very little effect.The Conversation

Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Chinese company monopolises printing of Nepal’s banknotes for nearly three years

Chinese company monopolises printing of Nepal’s banknotes for nearly three years (Photo: @yicaichina/X/IANS)

Kathmandu, (IANS) China Banknote Printing and Minting Corporation appears to be monopolising the printing of Nepal’s banknotes, with the Chinese state-owned company winning bids seven times consecutively over the past three years.

On Friday, Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), the central bank of the country, issued a letter of intent to award a contract to the Chinese company for the design, printing, supply, and delivery of 430 million pieces of NPR 1,000 denomination banknotes worth US$16.985 million.

According to the NRB’s notice, the Chinese company was selected as the substantially responsive, lowest evaluated bidder.

In nearly past three years, NRB has issued seven separate tenders for the design, printing, supply, and delivery of various denominations of banknotes. In each case, the Beijing-based company, located in the Xicheng District, emerged as the winning bidder.

Based on the contracts awarded during this period, the Chinese company is expected to earn around US$63 million from Nepal for printing approximately 2.38 billion pieces of banknotes.

The Chinese company does not have a long history of printing Nepal’s currency notes. In 2016, the Chinese company had secured the contract to print Nepal’s banknotes for the first time, according to the NRB.

On October 15 this year, NRB issued a letter of intent to print and supply 420 million pieces of NPR 50 denomination banknotes and related services. Its bid price of US$10.422 million was accepted as the lowest evaluated bid, according to the central bank’s notice.

Earlier, on June 22 this year, the same company was awarded a contract for the design, printing, supply, and delivery of 230 million pieces of NPR 500 denomination banknotes and related services. Its bid price of US$9.66 million was accepted as the substantially responsive, lowest evaluated bid.

On October 27 last year, the Chinese company won another bid to print Nepal’s banknotes. It was awarded the contract for printing and supplying 300 million pieces of NPR 100 denomination notes for US$8.996 million.

Similarly, on October 8 last year, the company won the bid to design, print, and supply 340 million pieces of NPR 10 denomination banknotes. It was awarded the contract for US$7.117 million as the lowest evaluated bidder.

Earlier, on July 10 last year, the company secured the contract for the design, printing, supply, and delivery of 350 million pieces of NPR 5 denomination banknotes at a bid price of US$5.158 million, which was also accepted as the lowest evaluated bid.

Likewise, on February 12, 2023, NRB issued a letter of intent to award the company a contract for the design, printing, supply, and delivery of 310 million pieces of NPR 20 denomination banknotes for US$4.698 million.

The last time an Indian company received a similar contract was on January 10, 2023, when NRB issued a letter of intent to award the Security Printing and Minting Corporation of India Limited a contract for the design, printing, supply, and delivery of 300 million pieces of NPR 50 denomination banknotes for US$5.048 million.

Earlier, on November 30, 2022, the same Indian company had been awarded a contract to print and supply 430 million pieces of NPR 1,000 denomination circulation banknotes for US$11.134 million.

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Singapore’s national identity excludes those who don’t look like a ‘regular family’

Pavan Mano, King's College London

Nationalism usually works on the basis that a nation should imagine itself as a “we”, with a common identity, history and culture. But it doesn’t always clearly say who the “we” are. Instead, it often works by saying who doesn’t belong – frequently by characterising these people in racialised ways.

Singapore is an interesting case study. Since independence in 1965, the small city-state has explicitly committed to a policy of multiracialism and multiculturalism. This principle is enshrined in its constitution, is widely accepted by Singaporeans and has become a firm pillar of national discourse.

Given this commitment, how does nationalism create exclusion in Singapore and what other forms could this take? In my March 2025 book, Straight Nation, I analyse Singapore’s version of a national identity to show how, while avoiding overtly racialised rhetoric and discrimination, it can define belonging in other ways.

Singaporean nationalism excludes some sections of society mainly through maintaining a set of heterosexual familial norms. This is one reason for the book’s title – it calls attention to how straightness sits at the heart of Singaporean identity. A certain kind of straight life is taken to be the model behaviour of a “normal” citizen.

Some of the things one is expected to do include starting a family – by meeting a member of the opposite sex, getting married and having children. This very specific version of heterosexuality is taken as the default in Singapore, and it ends up excluding a whole range of people.

Family and the nation

Heterosexuality being taken as normal and the expectations placed on the nuclear family are not uniquely Singaporean issues. But because of Singapore’s small size, the state has an outsize capacity to influence both how the “normal” Singaporean ought to live and the consequences that follow.

One of the most visible ways people are affected is through the public housing system. Almost 80% of Singaporean residents live in flats built by the country’s public housing authority, the Housing and Development Board (HDB). These flats are so ubiquitous that Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, referred to them as “national housing” in 2018.

The catch is that, with some small exceptions, one has to be married to buy a HDB flat. And because same-sex marriage is not recognised in Singapore, heterosexual marriage becomes a condition of access to this national symbol.

This obviously affects LGBTQ+ people, limiting their ability to access public housing and live independently. But the link between heterosexual marriage and public housing affects a whole range of other people. These include single people and parents, those who choose not to get married and people who are divorced.

There are other examples that demonstrate how it is taken as common sense that one’s life revolves around the nuclear family in Singapore – even though this might not be the case for everyone.

The opening anecdote in Straight Nation shows how the state treats the heterosexual nuclear family as containing the most important set of social relations. Like many other countries at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Singaporean government imposed a lockdown from April to June 2020. When it ended, restrictions were lifted in stages.

Initially, only some in-person interactions were allowed. Singapore’s then-health minister and current deputy prime minister, Gan Kim Yong, said: “Children or grandchildren can visit their parents or grandparents”. He suggested this would “allow families to spend time and provide support to one another” after eight weeks of isolation.

Until the restrictions were further eased 17 days later, visiting one’s parents or grandparents was the only form of in-person social interaction permitted. There was no mention as to what people without a family or estranged from them were meant to do for support. The same applies to people reliant on extended family, such as those who have no have no surviving parents or grandparents, or even those who depend on a close friend.

Again, this assumption can produce exclusions that go beyond sexual difference. To be clear, not everyone will be affected in the same way. But reading Singapore as a straight nation and identifying how one particular kind of heterosexual expression is reified is helpful.

It allows onlookers to ask how these norms can place different kinds of pressure on different people. And perhaps identifying the way in which so many people are affected by this regime of straightness will also help Singapore imagine a future that is fairer and more liveable for everyone.The Conversation

Pavan Mano, Lecturer in Global Cultures, King's College London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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