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Singapore’s national identity excludes those who don’t look like a ‘regular family’
Pavan Mano, King's College London
Nationalism usually works on the basis that a nation should imagine itself as a “we”, with a common identity, history and culture. But it doesn’t always clearly say who the “we” are. Instead, it often works by saying who doesn’t belong – frequently by characterising these people in racialised ways.
Singapore is an interesting case study. Since independence in 1965, the small city-state has explicitly committed to a policy of multiracialism and multiculturalism. This principle is enshrined in its constitution, is widely accepted by Singaporeans and has become a firm pillar of national discourse.
Given this commitment, how does nationalism create exclusion in Singapore and what other forms could this take? In my March 2025 book, Straight Nation, I analyse Singapore’s version of a national identity to show how, while avoiding overtly racialised rhetoric and discrimination, it can define belonging in other ways.
Singaporean nationalism excludes some sections of society mainly through maintaining a set of heterosexual familial norms. This is one reason for the book’s title – it calls attention to how straightness sits at the heart of Singaporean identity. A certain kind of straight life is taken to be the model behaviour of a “normal” citizen.
Some of the things one is expected to do include starting a family – by meeting a member of the opposite sex, getting married and having children. This very specific version of heterosexuality is taken as the default in Singapore, and it ends up excluding a whole range of people.
Family and the nation
Heterosexuality being taken as normal and the expectations placed on the nuclear family are not uniquely Singaporean issues. But because of Singapore’s small size, the state has an outsize capacity to influence both how the “normal” Singaporean ought to live and the consequences that follow.
One of the most visible ways people are affected is through the public housing system. Almost 80% of Singaporean residents live in flats built by the country’s public housing authority, the Housing and Development Board (HDB). These flats are so ubiquitous that Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, referred to them as “national housing” in 2018.
The catch is that, with some small exceptions, one has to be married to buy a HDB flat. And because same-sex marriage is not recognised in Singapore, heterosexual marriage becomes a condition of access to this national symbol.
This obviously affects LGBTQ+ people, limiting their ability to access public housing and live independently. But the link between heterosexual marriage and public housing affects a whole range of other people. These include single people and parents, those who choose not to get married and people who are divorced.
There are other examples that demonstrate how it is taken as common sense that one’s life revolves around the nuclear family in Singapore – even though this might not be the case for everyone.
The opening anecdote in Straight Nation shows how the state treats the heterosexual nuclear family as containing the most important set of social relations. Like many other countries at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Singaporean government imposed a lockdown from April to June 2020. When it ended, restrictions were lifted in stages.
Initially, only some in-person interactions were allowed. Singapore’s then-health minister and current deputy prime minister, Gan Kim Yong, said: “Children or grandchildren can visit their parents or grandparents”. He suggested this would “allow families to spend time and provide support to one another” after eight weeks of isolation.
Until the restrictions were further eased 17 days later, visiting one’s parents or grandparents was the only form of in-person social interaction permitted. There was no mention as to what people without a family or estranged from them were meant to do for support. The same applies to people reliant on extended family, such as those who have no have no surviving parents or grandparents, or even those who depend on a close friend.
Again, this assumption can produce exclusions that go beyond sexual difference. To be clear, not everyone will be affected in the same way. But reading Singapore as a straight nation and identifying how one particular kind of heterosexual expression is reified is helpful.
It allows onlookers to ask how these norms can place different kinds of pressure on different people. And perhaps identifying the way in which so many people are affected by this regime of straightness will also help Singapore imagine a future that is fairer and more liveable for everyone.![]()
Pavan Mano, Lecturer in Global Cultures, King's College London
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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China’s population shrinks again and is set to more than halve – here’s what that means
Xiujian Peng, Victoria University
China’s population has shrunk for the second year in a row.
The National Bureau of Statistics reports just 9.02 million births in 2023 – only half as many as in 2017. Set alongside China’s 11.1 million deaths in 2023, up 500,000 on 2022, it means China’s population shrank 2.08 million in 2023 after falling 850,000 in 2022. That’s a loss of about 3 million in two years.
The two consecutive declines are the first since the great famine of 1959-1961, and the trend is accelerating.
Updated projections from a research team at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, one of the first to predict the 2022 turndown, have China’s population shrinking from its present 1.4 billion to just 525 million by 2100.
China’s working-age population is projected to fall to just 210 million by 2100 – a mere one-fifth of its peak in 2014.
Deaths climbing as births falling
The death rate is climbing as an inevitable result of the population ageing, and also an upsurge of COVID in the first few months of 2023.
The population is ageing mainly because the birth rate is falling.
China’s total fertility rate, the average number of births per woman, was fairly flat at about 1.66 between 1991 and 2017 under China’s one-child policy. But it then fell to 1.28 in 2020, to 1.08 in 2022 and is now around 1, which is way below the level of 2.1 generally thought necessary to sustain a population.
By way of comparison, Australia and the United States have fertility rates of 1.6. In 2023 South Korea has the world’s lowest rate, 0.72.
Births plummet despite three-child policy
China abandoned its one-child policy in 2016. In 2021 the country introduced a three-child policy, backed by tax and other incentives.
But births are continuing to fall. In part this is because of an established one-child norm, in part because the one-child policy cut the number of women of child-bearing age, and in part because economic pressures are making parenthood less attractive.
China’s National Bureau of Statistics says employees of enterprises work an average of 49 hours per week, more than nine hours per day. Women graduates earn less than men and are increasingly postponing having children.
The Year of the Dragon offers hope
One hope is that 2024 will see a bump in births, being the year of the dragon in Chinese astrology, a symbol of good fortune.
Some families may have chosen to postpone childbirth during the less auspicious year of the rabbit in 2023. At least one study has identified such an effect.
An older, more dependent population
The same research team at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Centre for Policy Studies at Australia’s Victoria University have China’s population falling by more than one-half to around 525 million by 2100, a fall about 62 million bigger than previously forecast.
The working-age population is set to fall more sharply to 210 million.
We now expect the number of Chinese aged 65 and older to overtake the number of Chinese of traditional working age in 2077, three years earlier than previously.
By 2100 we expect every 100 Chinese of traditional working-age to have to support 137 elderly Chinese, up from just 21 at present.
Our central scenario assumes China’s fertility rate will recover, climbing slowly to 1.3. Our low scenario assumes it will decline further to 0.88 over the next decade and then gradually recover to 1.0 by 2050 before holding steady.
In none of these countries has fertility rebounded, despite government efforts. These trends point to what demographers call the “low-fertility trap” in which fertility becomes hard to lift once it falls below 1.5 or 1.4.
An earlier peak in world population
At present accounting for one-sixth of the world’s population, China’s accelerated decline will bring forward the day when the world’s population peaks.
Our updated forecast for China brings forward our forecast of when the world’s population will peak by one year to 2083, although there is much that is uncertain (including what will happen in India, now bigger than China, whose fertility rate has fallen below replacement level).
The accelerated decline in China’s population will weaken China’s economy and, through it, the world’s economy.
It will put downward pressure on Chinese consumer spending and upward pressure on wages and government spending. As the world’s second-largest economy, this weakness will present challenges to the world’s economic recovery.![]()
Xiujian Peng, Senior Research Fellow, Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Belt and Road Initiative’s new approach and what it means for Chinese investments in Indonesia
A shift in China’s international Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from focusing on massive projects such as roads, railways and ports to “small but beautiful” ones has been announced by President Xi Jinping.
Launched in 2013, the initiative provides loans to build infrastructure in partner countries worldwide, with connectivity as its main focus.
Indonesia is BRI’s biggest recipient in Southeast Asia. The initiative has helped the country finance Southeast Asia’s first high-speed train project and poured billions of dollars of investment into nickel processing, unlocking a critical mineral asset.
As a scholar in political economy and a former government relations consultant working closely with the Indonesian business sector, I’ve been considering what the “small-but-beautiful” approach means for Chinese investment in Indonesia.
What does “small-but-beautiful” BRI mean?
This shift in BRI strategy signifies a focus on projects that are of a smaller scale more efficient and less risky. It is a sensible move for China, considering the global economic slowdown, the country’s moderating domestic economy, and trade tensions with the US.
It is also an attempt to repair China’s global image, amid fears it is seen as a loan shark. Several countries, such as Zambia and Sri Lanka, have already gone into default. China’s reputation will suffer if too many countries fail to pay debts.
Defaults are a liability for the BRI cash flow and the Chinese economy. Beijing should find reliable debtors with solid and promising economic performance. That is precisely what Beijing sees in Jakarta: stable politics, a growing domestic market and pragmatic economic policies.
Chinese state investment in Indonesia
China’s state-driven investment in Indonesia focuses on public infrastructure project run by Indonesian state-owned enterprises and funded by Chinese state-owned lenders. The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train is an example of China’s investments in Indonesia.
Indonesia received a loan from the China Development Bank for the project and began construction in 2016. The project hit a US$2 billion cost overrun due to problems in its land acquisition and feasibility study.
Due to the ballooning costs, China asked for financial reassurance from the Indonesian government. This prompted the use of the state budget the public having been promised that the project would not touch any government funds.
This might set a precedent for future Chinese investment requiring state collateral – especially given Indonesia’s plan to persuade China to invest in Indonesia’s new capital project in East Kalimantan.
Indonesia has asked China to chip in to the US$35-billion project, which has struggled to secure investment. There has been no formal answer from the Chinese on the request thus far. However, investing in the new capital – which is far bigger and riskier than the high-speed railway project – does not fit the “small-and-beautiful” approach due to its high risks.
China may still opt to invest in the mega-project, but a more modest input seems more likely. And as part of risk sharing, Indonesian government collateral will be likely critical for its willingness to invest.
The Chinese private sector
While Chinese state-owned firms focus on funding public infrastructure projects, its private sector is more profit-oriented. This means that changes in BRI – which now emphasises more on less risky, bankable projects – is unlikely to affect Chinese private investment in Indonesia.
One of the critical projects between the two countries’ private sectors is a joint venture between Tsingshan Holding Group Company Limited, the China-based biggest private investor in nickel processing, and Merdeka Copper and Gold.
Close relationships with domestic tycoons have helped Chinese private sector firms navigate Indonesia’s planning rules and guide the engagement with the country’s domestic politics.
Chinese private companies such as Tsingshan are also backed by their state-owned firms in their Indonesian ventures. The Morowali Industrial Park in Central Sulawesi, Tsingshan’s most prominent project and the largest nickel processing park in Asia, is funded with loans from Chinese state-owned banks. The park’s processing technology contractor is mainly run by a Chinese state-owned subsidiary.
The Chinese state-owned companies find Tshinghan and other Chinese private sector operators successful in navigating their investment in complex and highly political sectors such as natural resources and critical minerals processing due to their strong links with Indonesia’s powerful politicians and business people.
Chipping in via profit-oriented projects run by private companies makes more sense for some Chinese state-owned firms than being directly involved in Indonesia’s public infrastructure projects. The investments driven by Chinese private sectors are relatively more risk-averse and commercially sound.
In the future, we will likely see a continuing trend of Chinese private sectors, supported by their state-owned firms, partnering with domestic business groups to invest in Indonesia’s profitable critical minerals and other sectors.![]()
Ahmad Syarif, Doctor of International Affairs candidate, Johns Hopkins University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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