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Singapore’s national identity excludes those who don’t look like a ‘regular family’
Pavan Mano, King's College London
Nationalism usually works on the basis that a nation should imagine itself as a “we”, with a common identity, history and culture. But it doesn’t always clearly say who the “we” are. Instead, it often works by saying who doesn’t belong – frequently by characterising these people in racialised ways.
Singapore is an interesting case study. Since independence in 1965, the small city-state has explicitly committed to a policy of multiracialism and multiculturalism. This principle is enshrined in its constitution, is widely accepted by Singaporeans and has become a firm pillar of national discourse.
Given this commitment, how does nationalism create exclusion in Singapore and what other forms could this take? In my March 2025 book, Straight Nation, I analyse Singapore’s version of a national identity to show how, while avoiding overtly racialised rhetoric and discrimination, it can define belonging in other ways.
Singaporean nationalism excludes some sections of society mainly through maintaining a set of heterosexual familial norms. This is one reason for the book’s title – it calls attention to how straightness sits at the heart of Singaporean identity. A certain kind of straight life is taken to be the model behaviour of a “normal” citizen.
Some of the things one is expected to do include starting a family – by meeting a member of the opposite sex, getting married and having children. This very specific version of heterosexuality is taken as the default in Singapore, and it ends up excluding a whole range of people.
Family and the nation
Heterosexuality being taken as normal and the expectations placed on the nuclear family are not uniquely Singaporean issues. But because of Singapore’s small size, the state has an outsize capacity to influence both how the “normal” Singaporean ought to live and the consequences that follow.
One of the most visible ways people are affected is through the public housing system. Almost 80% of Singaporean residents live in flats built by the country’s public housing authority, the Housing and Development Board (HDB). These flats are so ubiquitous that Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, referred to them as “national housing” in 2018.
The catch is that, with some small exceptions, one has to be married to buy a HDB flat. And because same-sex marriage is not recognised in Singapore, heterosexual marriage becomes a condition of access to this national symbol.
This obviously affects LGBTQ+ people, limiting their ability to access public housing and live independently. But the link between heterosexual marriage and public housing affects a whole range of other people. These include single people and parents, those who choose not to get married and people who are divorced.
There are other examples that demonstrate how it is taken as common sense that one’s life revolves around the nuclear family in Singapore – even though this might not be the case for everyone.
The opening anecdote in Straight Nation shows how the state treats the heterosexual nuclear family as containing the most important set of social relations. Like many other countries at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Singaporean government imposed a lockdown from April to June 2020. When it ended, restrictions were lifted in stages.
Initially, only some in-person interactions were allowed. Singapore’s then-health minister and current deputy prime minister, Gan Kim Yong, said: “Children or grandchildren can visit their parents or grandparents”. He suggested this would “allow families to spend time and provide support to one another” after eight weeks of isolation.
Until the restrictions were further eased 17 days later, visiting one’s parents or grandparents was the only form of in-person social interaction permitted. There was no mention as to what people without a family or estranged from them were meant to do for support. The same applies to people reliant on extended family, such as those who have no have no surviving parents or grandparents, or even those who depend on a close friend.
Again, this assumption can produce exclusions that go beyond sexual difference. To be clear, not everyone will be affected in the same way. But reading Singapore as a straight nation and identifying how one particular kind of heterosexual expression is reified is helpful.
It allows onlookers to ask how these norms can place different kinds of pressure on different people. And perhaps identifying the way in which so many people are affected by this regime of straightness will also help Singapore imagine a future that is fairer and more liveable for everyone.![]()
Pavan Mano, Lecturer in Global Cultures, King's College London
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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The US and China have reached a temporary truce in the trade wars, but more turbulence lies ahead
Peter Draper, University of Adelaide and Nathan Howard Gray, University of Adelaide
Defying expectations, the United States and China have announced an important agreement to de-escalate bilateral trade tensions after talks in Geneva, Switzerland.
The good, the bad and the ugly
The good news is their recent tariff increases will be slashed. The US has cut tariffs on Chinese imports from 145% to 30%, while China has reduced levies on US imports from 125% to 10%. This greatly eases major bilateral trade tensions, and explains why financial markets rallied.
The bad news is twofold. First, the remaining tariffs are still high by modern standards. The US average trade-weighted tariff rate was 2.2% on January 1 2025, while it is now estimated to be up to 17.8%. This makes it the highest tariff wall since the 1930s.
Overall, it is very likely a new baseline has been set. Bilateral tariff-free trade belongs to a bygone era.
Second, these tariff reductions will be in place for 90 days, while negotiations continue. Talks will likely include a long list of difficult-to-resolve issues. China’s currency management policy and industrial subsidies system dominated by state-owned enterprises will be on the table. So will the many non-tariff barriers Beijing can turn on and off like a tap.
China is offering to purchase unspecified quantities of US goods – in a repeat of a US-China “Phase 1 deal” from Trump’s first presidency that was not implemented. On his first day in office in January, amid a blizzard of executive orders, Trump ordered a review of that deal’s implementation. The review found China didn’t follow through on the agriculture, finance and intellectual property protection commitments it had made.
Unless the US has now decided to capitulate to Beijing’s retaliatory actions, it is difficult to see the US being duped again.
Failure to agree on these points would reveal the ugly truth that both countries continue to impose bilateral export controls on goods deemed sensitive, such as semiconductors (from the US to China) and processed critical minerals (from China to the US).
Moreover, in its so-called “reciprocal” negotiations with other countries, the US is pressing trading partners to cut certain sensitive China-sourced goods from their exports destined for US markets. China is deeply unhappy about these US demands and has threatened to retaliate against trading partners that adopt them.
A temporary truce
Overall, the announcement is best viewed as a truce that does not shift the underlying structural reality that the US and China are locked into a long-term cycle of escalating strategic competition.
That cycle will have its ups (the latest announcement) and downs (the tariff wars that preceded it). For now, both sides have agreed to announce victory and focus on other matters.
For the US, this means ensuring there will be consumer goods on the shelves in time for Halloween and Christmas, albeit at inflated prices. For China, it means restoring some export market access to take pressure off its increasingly ailing economy.
As neither side can vanquish the other, the likely long-term result is a frozen conflict. This will be punctuated by attempts to achieve “escalation dominance”, as that will determine who emerges with better terms. Observers’ opinions on where the balance currently lies are divided.
Along the way, and to use a quote widely attributed to Winston Churchill, to “jaw-jaw is better than to war-war”. Fasten your seat belts, there is more turbulence to come.
Where does this leave the rest of us?
Significantly, the US has not (so far) changed its basic goals for all its bilateral trade deals.
Its overarching aim is to cut the goods trade deficit by reducing goods imports and eliminating non-tariff barriers it says are “unfairly” prohibiting US exports. The US also wants to remove barriers to digital trade and investments by tech giants and “derisk” certain imports that it deems sensitive for national security reasons.
The agreement between the US and UK last week clearly reflects these goals in operation. While the UK received some concessions, the remaining tariffs are higher, at 10% overall, than on April 2 and subject to US-imposed import quotas. Furthermore, the UK must open its market for certain goods while removing China-originating content from steel and pharmaceutical products destined for the US.
For Washington’s Pacific defence treaty allies, including Australia, nothing has changed. Potentially difficult negotiations with the Trump administration lie ahead, particularly if the US decides to use our security dependencies as leverage to wring concessions in trade. Japan has already disavowed linking security and trade, and their progress should be closely watched.
The US has previously paused high tariffs on manufacturing nations in South-East Asia, particularly those used by other nations as export platforms to avoid China tariffs. Vietnam, Cambodia and others will face sustained uncertainty and increasingly difficult balancing acts. The economic stakes are higher for them.
They, like the Japanese, are long-practised in the subtle arts of balancing the two giants. Still, juggling ties with both Washington and Beijing will become the act of an increasingly high-wire trapeze artist.![]()
Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Jean Monnet Chair of Trade and Environment, University of Adelaide and Nathan Howard Gray, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Trade, University of Adelaide
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The global costs of the US-China tariff war are mounting. And the worst may be yet to come
The United States and China remain in a standoff in their tariff war. Neither side appears willing to budge.
After US President Donald Trump imposed massive 145% tariffs on Chinese imports in early April, China retaliated with its own tariffs of 125% on US goods.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said this week it’s up to China to de-escalate tensions. China’s Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, said the two sides are not talking.
The prospect of economic decoupling between the world’s two largest economies is no longer speculative. It is becoming a hard reality. While many observers debate who might “win” the trade war, the more likely outcome is that everyone loses.
A convenient target
Trump’s protectionist agenda has spared few. Allies and adversaries alike have been targeted by sweeping US tariffs. However, China has served as the main target, absorbing the political backlash of broader frustrations over trade deficits and economic displacement in the US.
The economic costs to China are undeniable. The loss of reliable access to the US market, coupled with mounting uncertainty in the global trading system, has dealt a blow to China’s export-driven sectors.
China’s comparative advantage lies in its vast manufacturing base and tightly integrated supply chains. This is especially true in high-tech and green industries such as electric vehicles, batteries and solar energy. These sectors are deeply dependent on open markets and predictable demand.
New trade restrictions in Europe, Canada and the US on Chinese electric vehicles, in particular, have already caused demand to drop significantly.
China’s GDP growth was higher than expected in the first quarter of the year at 5.4%, but analysts expect the effect of the tariffs to soon bite. A key measure of factory activity this week showed a contraction in manufacturing.
China’s economic growth has also been weighed down by structural headwinds, including industrial overcapacity (when a country’s production of goods exceeds demand), an ageing population, rising youth unemployment and persistent regional disparities. The property sector — once a pillar of the country’s economic rise — has become a source of financial stress. Local government debt is mounting and a pension crisis is looming.
Negotiations with the US might be desirable to end the tariff war. However, unilateral concessions on Beijing’s part are neither viable nor politically palatable.
Regional coordination
Trump’s tariff wars have done more than strain bilateral relationships; they have shaken the foundations of the global trading system.
By sidelining the World Trade Organization and embracing a transactional approach to bilateral trade, the US has weakened multilateral norms and emboldened protectionist tendencies worldwide.
One unintended consequence of this instability has been the resurgence of regional arrangements. In Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), backed by China and centred on the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia, has emerged as a credible alternative for economic cooperation.
Meanwhile, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) continues to expand, with the United Kingdom joining late last year.
Across Latin America, too, regional blocs are exploring new avenues for integration, hoping to buffer themselves against the shocks of resurgent protectionism.
But regionalism is no panacea. It cannot replicate the scale or efficiency of global trade, nor can it restore the predictability on which exporters depend.
Looming dangers
The greater danger is the world drifting into a Kindleberger Trap — a situation in which no power steps forward to provide the leadership necessary to sustain global public goods, or a stable trading system.
Economist Charles Kindleberger’s account of the Great Depression remains instructive: it was not the presence of conflict but the absence of leadership that brought about the global economy’s systemic collapse.
Without renewed global coordination, the economic fragmentation triggered by Trump’s tariff wars could give way to something far more dangerous than a recession – rising geopolitical and military tensions that no region can contain.
The political landscape is already fraught. The Chinese Communist Party, for instance, has long tethered its legitimacy to the promise of eventual unification with Taiwan. Yet the costs of using force remain prohibitively high.
Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s recent designation of China as a “foreign hostile force” have sharpened tensions. Beijing’s response has been calibrated – military exercises intended more as a warning than a prelude to conflict.
However, the intensifying trade war with the US may become the final straw that exhausts Beijing’s patience, leaving Taiwan as collateral damage in a US-China final showdown.
A role for collective leadership
China alone is neither able nor inclined to assume the mantle of global leadership. Its current focus is more on domestic priorities – sustaining economic growth and managing social stability – than on foreign policy.
Yet, Beijing can still play a constructive role in shaping the international environment through its cooperation with Europe, ASEAN and the Global South.
The objective is not to replace American hegemony, but to support a more multi-polar and collaborative system — one capable of sustaining global public goods in an era of uncertainty.
Paradoxically, a more coordinated effort by the rest of the world may ultimately help bring the US back into the fold. Washington may rediscover the strategic value of engagement — and return not as the sole leader, but as an indispensable partner.
In the short term, other states may seek to gain an advantage from the great power standoff. But they should remember that what begins as a clash between giants can quickly engulf bystanders.
In this volatile landscape, the path forward does not lie in exploiting disorder. Rather, nations must cautiously advance the shared interest in restoring a stable, rules-based global order.![]()
Kai He, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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China plans to build the world’s largest dam – but what does this mean for India and Bangladesh downstream?
China recently approved the construction of the world’s largest hydropower dam, across the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet. When fully up and running, it will be the world’s largest power plant – by some distance.
Yet many are worried the dam will displace local people and cause huge environmental disruption. This is particularly the case in the downstream nations of India and Bangladesh, where that same river is known as the Brahmaputra.
The proposed dam highlights some of the geopolitical issues raised by rivers that cross international borders. Who owns the river itself, and who has the right to use its water? Do countries have obligations not to pollute shared rivers, or to keep their shipping lanes open? And when a drop of rain falls on a mountain, do farmers in a different country thousands of miles downstream have a claim to use it? Ultimately, we still don’t know enough about these questions of river rights and ownership to settle disputes easily.
The Yarlung Tsangpo begins on the Tibetan Plateau, in a region sometimes referred to as the world’s third pole as its glaciers contain the largest stores of ice outside of the Arctic and Antarctica. A series of huge rivers tumble down from the plateau and spread across south and south-east Asia. Well over a billion people depend on them, from Pakistan to Vietnam.
Yet the region is already under immense stress as global warming melts glaciers and changes rainfall patterns. Reduced water flow in the dry season, coupled with sudden releases of water during monsoons, could intensify both water scarcity and flooding, endangering millions in India and Bangladesh.
The construction of large dams in the Himalayas has historically disrupted river flows, displaced people, destroyed fragile ecosystems and increased risks of floods. The Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Dam will likely be no exception.
The dam will sit along the tectonic boundary where the Indian and Eurasian plates converge to form the Himalayas. This makes the region particularly vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides, and sudden floods when natural dams burst.
Downstream, the Brahmaputra is one of south Asia’s mightiest rivers and has been integral to human civilisation for thousands of years. It’s one of the world’s most sediment-rich rivers, which helps form a huge and fertile delta.
Yet a dam of this scale would trap massive amounts of sediment upstream, disrupting its flow downstream. This could make farming less productive, threatening food security in one of the world’s most densely populated regions.
The Sundarbans mangrove forest, a Unesco World Heritage Site that stretches across most of coastal Bangladesh and a portion of India, is particularly vulnerable. Any disruption to the balance of sediment could accelerate coastal erosion and make the already low lying area more vulnerable to sea-level rise.
Unfortunately, despite the transboundary nature of the Brahmaputra, there is no comprehensive treaty governing it. This lack of formal agreements complicates efforts to ensure China, India and Bangladesh share the water equitably and work together to prepare for disasters.
These sorts of agreements are perfectly possible: 14 countries plus the European Union are parties to a convention on protecting the Danube, for instance. But the Brahmaputra is not alone. Many transboundary rivers in the global south face similar neglect and inadequate research.
Researching rivers
In our recent study, colleagues and I analysed 4,713 case studies across 286 transboundary river basins. We wanted to assess how much academic research there was on each, what themes it focused on, and how that varied depending on the type of river. We found that, while large rivers in the global north receive considerable academic attention, many equally important rivers in the global south remain overlooked.
What research there is in the global south is predominantly led by institutions from the global north. This dynamic influences research themes and locations, often sidelining the most pressing local issues. We found that research in the global north tends to focus on technical aspects of river management and governance, whereas studies in the global south primarily examine conflicts and resource competition.
In Asia, research is concentrated on large, geopolitically significant basins like the Mekong and Indus. Smaller rivers where water crises are most acute are often neglected. Something similar is happening in Africa, where studies focus on climate change and water-sharing disputes, yet a lack of infrastructure limits broader research efforts.
Small and medium-sized river basins, critical to millions of people in the global south, are among the most neglected in research. This oversight has serious real-world consequences. We still don’t know enough about water scarcity, pollution, and climate change impacts in these regions, which makes it harder to develop effective governance and threatens the livelihoods of everyone who depends on these rivers.
A more inclusive approach to research will ensure the sustainable management of transboundary rivers, safeguarding these vital resources for future generations.
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Mehebub Sahana, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, Geography, University of Manchester
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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FILE PHOTO: Travellers push trolleys with their luggage at the departure area of the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi, India, December 14, 2022. REUTERS/Anushree Fadnavis/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse on December 13, 2024. GREG BAKER/Pool via REUTERS//File PhotoChina says ready to usher new era of development in Sri Lanka
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