Brics+ and the Tricky Business of Balancing Global Geopolitics

By Priyal Singh: Will an expanded BRICS precipitate a new international order, or collapse under the weight of its internal contradictions? The words of 13th century Persian poet Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī, 'As you start to walk the way, the way appears,' certainly found new resonance in Johannesburg last week at the 15th BRICS Summit. Apart from expanding the diplomatic club to include Iran, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the summit revealed the global south's growing disillusionment with the current structure of the international system. These frustrations have bolstered BRICS' appeal as a counterweight to leading Western countries, such as those composing the G7. More significantly, an expanded BRICS represents a resounding call for international reform by global south states, exclusive from, and in opposition to, traditional Western powers. This unprecedented moment reflects the shifting locus of global power, and has propelled an expanded BRICS to chart a way into unknown territory. Decisions over the nature and trajectory of global order were once the sole preserve of the European 'great' powers, along with the United States (US). The contemporary international system will undoubtedly be shaped by the Asia-Pacific region, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. If global institutions fail to evolve, international cooperation on pressing issues will inevitably fail If global institutions fail to evolve and accommodate this reality, international cooperation on the most pressing issues of our time will inevitably fail. On paper, this is the fundamental challenge BRICS intends to address in order to bring about a more 'representative, fairer international order, [and] a reformed multilateral system.' How it does so, however, remains poorly defined.  One likely approach is to use the group's combined economic clout to pursue global governance, financial and justice system reform, and alternative paths on specific issues like climate change. Already, the current BRICS states' collective economic output (based on GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity) is roughly US$3 trillion larger than the G7, which includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the US and United Kingdom. (As a non-enumerated member, the European Union is excluded.) With six new BRICS members in 2024, this difference rises to just under US$11 trillion. However, economic output measured by GDP based on current exchange rates places the G7 as the larger combined economy (even with the six new BRICS members). Coordinated action on points of contention may not be as easy for BRICS as for the G7 Regardless, countries in the global south are increasingly poised to challenge the economic dominance of traditional powers. And based on the former's current growth trajectories, will decisively outperform the G7 economies over the coming decades. This combined economic influence could help to secure greater representation and fairer rules and procedures in the United Nations Security Council, International Criminal Court, World Bank and International Monetary Fund - among others alluded to in the BRICS Johannesburg II Declaration. However, coordinating common action on specific points of contention may not be as easy for the expanded BRICS grouping as for the G7. G7 countries have structured their cooperation on global matters around shared liberal political values and norms, particularly on democracy and civil liberties. While these have been threatened in recent years by the rise of populist right-wing administrations, G7 members' considerable normative and political alignment underpins their global economic clout. The expanded BRICS grouping, on the other hand, is a more arbitrary constellation of states with very different (and sometimes diametrically opposed) political systems and values. They range from progressive constitutional democracies to closed and repressive theocracies, to countries experimenting with hybrid authoritarianism. Ironically, BRICS may be in its ascendency due to its ambiguity and loosely articulated vision: An analysis of various governance variables across member countries, including perceptions of political stability, rule of law, government effectiveness and basic freedoms, reveals a high level of variance. Scores for each of these variables show a standard deviation from the mean that is often more than double that of G7 countries. That raises serious questions about BRICS' ability to pursue coherent, coordinated action on global institutional reform, despite members agreeing that the international system is unfairly structured. Without a robust normative basis for cooperation, disagreements over issues such as gender equality, individual rights and liberties, and the character of a new international order, could derail momentum needed for meaningful change.  Ironically, BRICS may well be in its ascendency due to its ambiguity and loosely articulated vision of multipolarity and a reformed international system. However, as the group expands and evolves into something more concrete, difficult issues may not be as easy to kick down the road as before. For example, how do all members justify provisions in the Johannesburg II Declaration on respecting international humanitarian law in conflict situations, increased participation of women in peace processes, and the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all? Squaring these provisions with the brazen violations by certain current and incoming BRICS members will test the mettle of the diplomatic club. These contradictions must be overcome for BRICS to muster not only its economic clout, but the moral and political capital to pursue reforms and serve as a counterweight to the G7. Rumi's wisdom still rings true, but as the expanded BRICS group marches towards a new world order, the way ahead may be murkier than initially expected.Priyal Singh, Senior Researcher, Africa in the World, ISS Pretoria. Source: https://allafrica.com/
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Haidian's high-tech contributes much to GDP

Photo shows the interior of Tencent Beijing headquarters at the ZPark Phase 2 in Haidian district of Beijing. [Photo/Xinhua]

Beijing's Haidian district last year became the first prefecture-level district in the country to surpass the 1 trillion yuan ($147.52 billion) threshold in GDP, driven by its science and technology innovations, a senior official said on Thursday.

Haidian's 2022 GDP grew 3.5 percent year-on-year, said Wang Zhenrong, spokesperson for the Haidian district bureau of statistics.

According to the district, its total revenue of high-tech enterprises reached 3.8 trillion yuan in 2022, increasing 7.5 percent. The added value of core industries in the digital economy contributed over 50 percent of Beijing's GDP.

In 2022, high-tech enterprises in Haidian spent 203.83 billion yuan in science research and development, increasing by 7.8 percent and representing 52.7 percent of that of Beijing.

"In 2023, we will intensify efforts in sci-tech innovation by developing quantum information, disruptive materials and open source chips, supporting universities and enterprises participating in national research projects, accelerating the transformation of scientific research and building a modern industrial system," said Wang Yuxia, deputy director of the Haidian district development and reform commission.

"Since 1994, we spent 10 percent of our annual revenue on R&D each year. For a manufacturing company, such investment for such a long time is rare. That gives us a leading position in the industry," said Xi Shuyang, vice-president of Beijing Sifang Automation Co Ltd, a mechanical and electrical product supplier.

Haidian also made efforts to help enterprises prosper. In 2022, 40.5 billion yuan in renewed loans and initial loans were approved, both up by over 30 percent. Some 12,800 small, medium-sized and micro enterprises, as well as individual businesses enjoyed a VAT rebate of 16.49 billion yuan.

In 2022, 34,900 new enterprises were established, up 58.5 percent year-on-year. Of them, 19 were publicly listed companies and 285 companies were new foreign companies.Haidian is a leader in providing cross-provincial public services by applying ChainMaker, China's first autonomous controllable blockchain hardware and software technology system. Using ChainMaker, low-risk real estate investment project completions and registrations are processed simultaneously and internet livestreaming anchors are able to register as market entities in the form of a "cluster registration". Source: China.org.cn

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Chinese disengagement in Ladakh is a small lollipop to India!

It is quite possible that the Indian side conveyed to Beijing that with China’s rigid stance on the border standoff, Prime Minister Narendra Modi may consider it difficult to attend the summit, and more importantly, a one-to-one meeting between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping may not be possible unless Beijing shows some progress on further disengagement

By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch (retd) : The 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks over the India-China standoff in Eastern Ladakh held on July 17, 2022, led by the Leh-based 14 Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Anindya Sengupta, and China's South Xinjiang Military District Commander, Major General Yang Yin, had indicated no breakthrough.

During the 15th round of talks, held on March 11, 2022, that lasted for around 13 hours, the Indian side had pushed China for the resolution of remaining intrusion areas (dubbed "friction points") in Ladakh but there was also no breakthrough. India had hoped that a resolution on Patrolling Point (PP) 15 in Hot Springs would be arrived at but the joint statement issued after the talks said that the "two sides carried forward their discussions from the previous round", 14th round, held on January 12, "for the resolution of relevant issues along the LAC in the Western Sector". It said both sides "agreed to maintain dialogue via military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable resolution at the earliest".

Not only was the 14th round of talks inconclusive, but the 13th Corps Commander-Level meeting that took place on October 21, 2021, also ended in a stalemate, after which the Indian Army said that the "constructive suggestions" it made were not agreeable to the Chinese side, which also could not provide any "forward-looking" proposals. The Chinese later released a press statement calling India's demands "unreasonable".

Now almost two months after the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks, India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has issued a statement on September 8, 2022, that reads: “On 08 September 2022, according to the consensus reached in the 16th round of India China Corps Commander Level Meeting, the Indian and Chinese troops in the area of Gogra-Hotsprings (PP-15) have begun to disengage in a coordinated and planned way, which is conducive to the peace and tranquillity in the border areas.”

Sudden disengagement

The next day on September 9, China’s state media Global Times tweeted: “Chinese and Indian troops in the area of Jianan Daban have begun to disengage in a coordinated and planned manner on Thursday (September 8), according to the consensus reached on 16th Round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting: Chinese Defense Ministry.”

It is significant to note that the 16th round of talks was held ten days after India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had an hour-long meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Bali, Indonesia, on July 7, 2022, on the sidelines of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the G20 countries. After the discussion, Jaishankar stated that he had focused on specific outstanding issues in India-China bilateral relationship pertaining to the border situation. But despite this, China gave no indication of any possibility of changing the status quo in Eastern Ladakh.

How then is this sudden disengagement at PP 15? The 2022 annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of State is being held on September 15-16 at Samarkand, Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan has taken over the chairmanship of SCO from Tajikistan in September last year. It is quite possible that the Indian side conveyed to Beijing that with China’s rigid stance on the border standoff, Prime Minister Narendra Modi may consider it difficult to attend the summit, and more importantly, a one-to-one meeting between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping may not be possible unless Beijing shows some progress on further disengagement.

As per recent news, the Chinese side has pulled back northeast of PP 17A while the Indian troops have pulled back to PP-17. In between is the no-patrol zone which means that Indian troops can no more patrol up to PP 15 which was our forward PP in this sector.

China loses nothing:  On the other hand, China loses nothing. The extent of the buffer zone has not been specified. China has ensured the buffer zone since PP-15 in the Kungrang Nullah area provides an access route to Kongka La - a key pass leading into the Aksai Chin hinterland and beyond. In the event of any possibility of hostilities, China can reoccupy PP 15 at the earliest.

The deepest intrusion by China is at Y Junction in the Depsang area – 20 km deep. This denies our patrols to go up to PPs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13, even as these PPS were cited short of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Moreover, India vacated the Kailash Range without linking it with the Chinese withdrawal from Depsang and Demchok areas.

Having consolidated its defences in the intrusion areas, China is sitting pretty in Eastern Ladakh with buffer zones in Indian territory, continuing to block traditional patrolling areas in Depsang plains and Charding Nala regions, and denying traditional grazing areas to our villagers in Eastern Ladakh. Disengagement from PP 15 is just a small lollipop to India. Source:w!
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